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NOTES 
HARMONIZING U.S. SECURITIES AND 
FUTURES REGULATIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has authority over 
U.S. securities1 markets, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) has authority over U.S. futures2 markets.3 When the regulatory 
scheme for these markets first coalesced in the 1930s, there was a clear 
distinction between the instruments being traded on the two. Today, 
however, the boundary between securities and commodities is far more 
ambiguous. Traditional securities and commodities still exist, but a vast, 
complex array of instruments that are both futures and securities developed 
during and after the latter half of the 20th century. Futures on financial 
instruments now account for the vast majority of trading volume on futures 
markets.4 
As a result of this evolution, the bifurcated scheme distinguishing 
securities from futures is outdated and should be overhauled. This note 
addresses the need for U.S. financial regulators to reform the system 
currently governing securities and futures, and asserts that the functions of 
the SEC and the CFTC should be merged into a single market regulator 
with uniform rules. 
Part II of this note briefly recounts the development of the current 
system, and summarizes prior movements towards a unified regulatory 
agency. Part III explores the short-comings of the current approach towards 
regulation by detailing its disadvantages in the marketplace. Part IV 
analyzes several key areas where genuine reform of the underlying 
regulations is necessary, and proposes some solutions for a harmonized 
regulatory regime. Part V concludes this note by summarizing the 
importance of these issues. 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Securities include stocks, bonds, notes, treasury stocks, debentures, and a wide variety of 
other instruments. Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(10) (2006). 
 2. “Futures are agreements that obligate the holder to buy or sell a specific amount or value 
of an underlying asset, reference rate, or index at a specified price on a specified date. These 
contracts may be satisfied by delivery or by offset with another contract.” U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, ISSUES RELATED TO THE SHAD-JOHNSON JURISDICTION ACCORD 1 n.2 (2000). 
 3. Id. at 5. 
 4. See Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securities and 
Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK J. INT’L 
L. 319, 361 (2003). 
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II. A SHORT HISTORY 
The bifurcated regulatory system of U.S. markets, known colloquially 
as “functional” regulation,5 owes its evolution to little more than the 
accidents of history. While the practice of futures trading traces its lineage 
back to the twelfth century, the regulatory history relevant to this note only 
goes back to Midwestern farmers who sought to hedge the risk of planting 
their crops around the turn of the twentieth century. The practice of 
securities trading has an equally lengthy pedigree, but similarly, this note 
focuses only on the modern regulatory environment, which has emerged 
since the Great Depression. Although both regimes developed upon 
separate but parallel tracks for the better part of half a century, there have 
been genuine, if unsuccessful, efforts in recent years to bridge the 
regulatory gap and combine the CFTC and SEC. 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 19746 created the 
CFTC as a response to commodity price inflation and several scandals in 
the trading of unregulated commodity options during the early 1970s.7 That 
legislation updated and modernized the earlier Commodity Exchange Act of 
1936,8 which had proven ineffective at stopping the price manipulation it 
was created to combat.9 The 1974 Act gave the CFTC “exclusive 
jurisdiction . . . with respect to accounts, agreements . . . and transactions 
involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or 
executed on a contract market.”10 That broad grant of authority eventually 
led to a series of disputes regarding the boundary between the CFTC and 
the SEC.11 The now infamous Shad-Johnson Accords,12 later codified into 
law,13 addressed some of those conflicts, as did the Commodity Futures 
Trading Modernization Act of 2000.14 
The SEC was created in 193415 to enforce the provisions of the 
Securities Act of 1933,16 as well as several other important financial 
regulations.17 These pieces of legislation were a direct response to the 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Melanie L. Fein, Functional Regulation: A Concept for Glass Steagall Reform, 2 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 89, 90 (1995). 
 6. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 
(1974). 
 7. Markham, supra note 4, at 341. 
 8. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936). 
 9. Markham, supra note 4, at 340–41. 
 10. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)1(a) (2000). 
 11. E.g., Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 12. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2. 
 13. An Act to Clarify the Jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Definition of Security, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 97–303, 96 Stat. 1409 (1982); Futures 
Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97–444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983). 
 14. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–554, 114 Stat. 2763 
(2000). 
 15. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78d. 
 16. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a–77aa). 
 17. See Markham, supra note 4, at 326 n.34. 
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Senate Banking Committee’s investigation into the stock market crash of 
1929,18 and the subsequent emphasis placed on securities regulation by 
President Franklin Roosevelt.19 Roosevelt was particularly concerned with 
the principle of full disclosure,20 which has since become the cornerstone of 
modern securities regulation.21 The SEC operates in tandem with a bevy of 
other actors to form a complex, multi-layered regulatory framework that 
includes non-governmental self-regulatory organizations (SROs), state 
attorneys general, and the various accounting firms and ratings agencies 
whose approval is necessary for listing on the exchanges.22 
Despite their divergent histories and different functions, the recent past 
has seen at least one attempt to merge the two agencies in the form of the 
Markets and Trading Reorganization and Reform Act,23 which was 
introduced and defeated in the House of Representatives by Representative 
Wyden in 1995 amidst lukewarm support from both agencies.24 The bill 
would have ceded the functions of both the SEC25 and CFTC26 to a newly 
established Markets and Trading Commission,27 and created an over-
arching Federal Financial Markets Coordinating Council,28 composed of the 
heads of the Department of Treasury, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 
Markets and Trading Commission, and other financial regulatory bodies.29 
While the act was intended to bring some clarity and coordination to 
financial regulation,30 with the exception of the ability to change margin 
requirements31 it gave the Markets and Trading Commission no authority to 
resolve any of the underlying regulatory conflicts that gave rise to the need 
for clarity and coordination in the first place.32 In the end, it was little more 
                                                                                                                 
 18. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 13 (1982). 
 19. Id. at 51–53. 
 20. “Let in the light!” Id. at 20, 40. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Markham, supra note 4, at 325–38 (fully discussing the relations among these actors). 
 23. Markets and Trading Reorganization and Reform Act, H.R. 718, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 24. Markets and Trading Reorganization and Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 718 Before the 
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Securities, and Gov’t Sponsored Enterprises of the H. Comm. on 
Banking and Financial Services, 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, 
SEC). 
 25. H.R. 718 § 202. 
 26. H.R. 718 § 201. 
 27. H.R. 718 § 101. 
 28. H.R. 718 § 301. 
 29. H.R. 718 § 301(b). 
 30. “The purposes of this act are . . . to establish a single federal regulatory body . . . to 
coordinate the regulation of all financial markets . . . and . . . to ensure the competitiveness of 
those markets.” H.R. 718 § 2. 
 31. H.R. 718 § 203. 
 32. H.R. 718 § 411. 
[T]he Commission . . . may exercise any authority available by law . . . with respect to 
such function to the official or agency from which such function is transferred, and the 
actions of the Commission in exercising such authority shall have the same force and 
effect as when exercised by such official or agency. 
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than a glorified reshuffling of the existing bureaucracy33 and its failure to 
address the underlying regulatory issues was considered a significant flaw.34 
The issue has been raised again, however, as legislators continue to be 
frustrated by the inefficiencies of the bifurcated system.35 There is concern 
that an outright merger of the SEC and CFTC is “probably a bridge too 
far,”36 but it has not swayed industry advocates from pressing for 
comprehensive reform.37 The consensus amongst Congress and the 
securities and commodities industries appears to be that the rules need to be 
harmonized, which would accomplish in substance what the Markets and 
Trading Reorganization and Reform Act attempted to do in form. 
III. DUELING AGENCIES HELP NO ONE 
Bifurcation of the regulatory system was once a common-sense, 
efficient method of oversight because of the clear distinction between the 
products traded on securities markets versus those traded on futures 
markets.38 Recent innovations have significantly blurred the lines between 
the two areas, however, and created considerable regulatory uncertainty 
among investors, regulators, and financial institutions. Some professionals 
even attest that this uncertainty has been detrimental to the formation of 
new products on the markets.39 The costs and uncertainty that have befallen 
those who did attempt to innovate, such as the Chicago Board of Trade,40 
provide a concrete example of the burdensome ordeal that awaits any 
product that cuts across the clear regulatory distinctions the two agencies 
prefer to maintain. These regulatory hurdles are even seen by some as a 
reason for the decline in U.S. competitiveness in relation to other financial 
markets around the world.41 Although they may not speak directly to the 
problem, recent attempts by SROs to reduce overlapping regulations by 
harmonizing their rules and combining their enforcement functions is a 
                                                                                                                 
Id. 
 33. See generally H.R. 718 §§ 412–13 (giving the Commission the power to delegate tasks and 
reorganize the various administrative entities within the existing bureaucracy). 
 34. Financial Market Regulation: Benefits and Risks of Merging the SEC and CFTC: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Securities and GSEs of the H. Comm. on Banking and 
Financial Services, 104th Cong. 6 (1995) (statement of James Bothwell, Director, Financial 
Institutions and Markets Issues, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office) [hereinafter Bothwell Testimony]. 
 35. Study Sought on Blending SEC, CFTC, FINANCIAL ADVISOR, July 12, 2007, http://fa–
mag.com/news.php?id_content=4&idNews=1021. 
 36. Id. (quoting Sen. Jack Reed). 
 37. Gary DeWaal, America Must Create a Single Financial Regulator, FIN. TIMES, May 19, 
2005, at 13. 
 38. Markham, supra note 4, at 346. 
 39. See DeWaal, supra note 37. 
 40. See infra note 45. 
 41. See generally MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP 78–85 (2007). 
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clear indicator that the markets are over-burdened by excessive, and 
sometimes contradictory, regulations.42 
Regulatory confusion with regard to many emerging instruments stems 
from the hap-hazard division of authority between the two agencies. The 
CFTC was broadly given “exclusive jurisdiction . . . with respect to 
accounts, agreements . . . and transactions involving contracts of sale of a 
commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract 
market . . . or derivatives transaction execution facility registered pursuant 
to”43 the Act. Unfortunately, this grant of power would have easily 
encompassed many securities products (such as puts and calls on individual 
stocks) in the absence of vague limitations intended to carve out a niche for 
the SEC.44 Despite the fact that various instruments that were both 
securities and futures existed at the time these regulations were first 
promulgated, Congress failed to make any clear distinction between the 
authorities of the two agencies to regulate them.45 
The most famous dispute generated by this ambiguous bifurcation was 
the battle between the SEC and the CFTC in Board of Trade of the City of 
Chicago v. SEC.46 There, the Board of Trade (with support from the CFTC) 
challenged the approval given to the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
(CBOE) by the SEC to create a market for exchange-formed off-set options 
in government national mortgage associations (GNMAs, also known as 
Ginnie Maes), arguing that only the CFTC had the authority to give such 
permission.47 The dispute coalesced because, at the time, the CFTC had 
banned the trading of options on exchanges it governed, which included the 
Board of Trade but not the CBOE, which was governed by the SEC.48 The 
court noted that the options in question were technically both “securities” 
and “commodities,”49 but concluded that the exclusive jurisdiction given to 
the CFTC to regulate commodities trumped any potential jurisdictional 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Gaston F. Ceron, Moving the Market: NASD, NYSE Regulatory Arm Plan Oversight Entity, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2006, at C3. 
 43. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1)(A) (2007). 
 44. The carve-out appears intentionally broad, claiming that “nothing contained in this section 
shall (I) supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.” 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1)(A); accord 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1)(C). 
This chapter shall not apply to and the Commission shall have no jurisdiction to 
designate a board of trade as a contract market for any transaction whereby any party to 
such transaction acquires any put, call, or other option on one or more 
securities . . . including any group or index of such securities, or any interesting therein 
or based on the value thereof. 
Id. 
 45. See Bd. of Trade of the City of Chi. v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137, 1148 (7th Cir. 1982); U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing the significance of the case). 
 46. 677 F.2d at 1148. 
 47. Id. at 1140–41. 
 48. Id. at 1143–45. 
 49. Id. at 1142 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(10) and 7 U.S.C.A. § 2). 
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claim by the SEC based on a finding that “GNMA’s are not traditional 
stocks and GNMA options have the character of a legitimate commodity 
derivative.”50 
Although the case was deemed moot on appeal when the two agencies 
reached an informal agreement to share authority in the Shad-Johnson 
Accord,51 the fundamental conflict remains. A bifurcated regulatory system, 
designed for the distinctly different markets of the 1930s, is ill-equipped to 
handle the needs and challenges of increasingly complex and intertwined 
markets in the twenty-first century. Even if costly disagreements over new 
products could be avoided, there is still concern that bifurcation ignores the 
linkages between the two markets to the detriment of the economy, leading 
to events like the stock market crash of 1987.52 
There is also some indication that the United States is losing ground to 
other financial centers, like London, because of the burdens of bifurcated 
regulation. Much of the criticism in this area is directed at the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act of 200253 and the burdens it placed on public equity offerings, 
particularly as evidenced by the sharp reduction in U.S. initial public 
offerings (IPOs) in recent years.54 However, there have also been 
suggestions that those problems have combined with the rise in derivatives 
trading over the past few years to make markets with unified regulatory 
schemes, like London, much more attractive centers of investment.55 Using 
the example of a common hedge fund in a recent Financial Times op-ed, 
one commentator argued for unified regulation by noting that when 
“trad[ing] both equities and futures, its positions are monitored under 
separate regulatory environments subject to different rules” in the United 
States, as compared to the United Kingdom, where “a hedge fund can 
maintain both . . . positions in one regulatory environment.”56 
Although it does not speak directly to the issue at hand, the recent 
decision by the NYSE and the NASD to “consolidate their member 
regulation operations”57 under a uniform banner is a sure signal from the 
private sector that the financial markets are over-regulated. Indeed, 
combating over-regulation was one of the major motivators of the merger.58 
NASD Chairman Mary Schapiro noted that one of the plan’s aims was to 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id. at 1152. 
 51. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 2, at 6. 
 52. See generally REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS 
(1988) (popularly known as “The Brady Commission Report”) [hereinafter BRADY COMMISSION 
REPORT]. 
 53. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 805 (2002). 
 54. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 2 (2006). 
 55. DeWaal, supra note 37. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., NASD and NYSE Group Announce Plan to 
Consolidate Regulation of Securities Firms (Nov. 28, 2006), available at 
http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2006NewsReleases/P017973. 
 58. Id. 
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effectuate “a more sensible and less complex regulatory regime that makes 
private sector regulation more efficient and effective.”59 SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox echoed her comments, citing efforts toward “eliminating 
overlapping regulation, establishing a uniform set of rules, and placing 
oversight responsibility in a single organization” as key strengths of the 
merger.60 These advantages are nearly identical to some of those advocated 
nearly twenty years ago by the then Commissioner of the SEC when 
speaking of the potential for merging that organization with the CFTC.61 
IV. REFORM OF THE UNDERLYING REGULATIONS 
Although the notion of merging the SEC and CFTC is not necessarily 
new, prior proposals have envisioned a bureaucratic reshuffling that would 
coordinate their enforcement activities, but leave in place the bifurcation of 
the underlying securities and futures regulations.62 While this might 
technically eliminate some much-lamented jurisdictional battles, it would 
not bring any uniformity to the marketplace, and would “continue to require 
teams of investigators and attorneys with specialized expertise in both 
futures and securities laws and markets regardless of whether they are 
housed in one or two agencies.”63 Despite the small advantages such a 
reshuffling might provide, investors looking to trade in futures and 
securities would continue to maintain separate accounts, typically overseen 
by separate advisors, subject to separate regulatory regimes. Genuine 
reforms that would allow investors to maintain one account, with one 
advisor, and subject to only one regulatory regime, can only be achieved by 
harmonizing futures and securities regulations. Although there are 
numerous points of conflict, priority should be placed on harmonizing the 
areas of margin requirements, suitability rules, account protections, insider 
trading, and broker-dealer and futures commission merchant (FCM) 
registration. 
A. MARGIN REQUIREMENTS 
Authority over securities margin requirements is officially delegated to 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, with an eye towards 
“preventing the excessive use of credit for the purchasing or carrying of 
securities.”64 The Board of Governors has issued margin requirements and 
                                                                                                                 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Mary L. Schapiro, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks Before the Law and Compliance Division of 
the Futures Industry Association (May 3, 1990). This is surely not a coincidence, as the 
Commissioner at that time was the same Mary Schapiro who now heads the NASD. 
 62. See supra Part II. 
 63. Bothwell Testimony, supra note 34, at 3. 
 64. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78g(a) (2006). 
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related rules pursuant to Regulation T,65 requiring a margin of anywhere 
from 50% to 150% of the value of the securities involved in the 
transaction66 to be deposited within five business days of its execution.67 
“The primary purpose of the margin requirements was to provide the Board 
with an effective method of reducing the amount of the Nation’s credit 
resources which could be directed by speculation into the stock market.”68 
The margin requirements are thus quite high, as “it is the public policy of 
the United States . . . to discourage and prevent the purchase of stock on 
extended credit.”69 By contrast, authority over futures margin requirements 
is delegated to the contract markets themselves,70 or to self-regulating 
registered futures associations,71 such as the National Futures Association 
(NFA).72 Although margin levels vary slightly by exchange, and even by 
commodity, they are typically about 5% of the value of the underlying 
futures contract.73 
These vastly different margin requirements appear to be the result of the 
different roles played by margin in the securities and futures industries. In 
case of the former, it is considered a down payment on the purchase of an 
asset, while in the latter case it is considered a performance bond on the 
obligations set out in the underlying contract.74 In addition, the higher 
                                                                                                                 
 65. 12 C.F.R. § 220.1 (2008). 
 66. 12 C.F.R. §220.12(a)–(f). But see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78g(c)(2)(B) (allowing the SEC and 
CFTC to jointly regulate margin requirements for securities–futures products and comparable 
options contracts authorized by 15 U.S.C.A. § 78f(a)). 
 67. 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c)(3)(i). But see 12 C.F.R. § 220.4(c)(3)(ii) (allowing extension of the 
payment period in five–day increments upon application to the applicable governing exchange or 
SRO). 
 68. Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F.Supp. 453, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Stonehill v. Sec. Nat’l Bank, 
68 F.R.D. 24, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
The “main purpose” of the margin rules was to regulate the volume of credit flowing 
into the securities market: “The main purpose is to give a Government credit agency an 
effective method of reducing the aggregate amount of the nation’s credit resources 
which can be directed by speculation into the stock market and out of other more 
desirable uses of commerce and industry—to prevent a recurrence of the pre-crash 
situation where funds which would otherwise have been available at normal interest 
rates for uses of local commerce, industry and agriculture, were drained by far higher 
rates into security loans and the New York call market.” 
Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1934)); accord 15 U.S.C.A. § 78g(a) 
(2006) (“For the purpose of preventing the excessive use of credit for the purchase or carrying of 
securities . . . .”). 
 69. Klein v. D.R. Comenzo Co., 207 N.Y.S.2d 739, 740 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1960). 
 70. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7(d)(11) (2007) (“financial integrity of contracts”). 
 71. 7 U.S.C.A. § 7a-2(b) (“delegation of functions under core principles”). 
 72. The NFA is the largest of such self–regulating associations, however its margin authority 
is in turn delegated to its member contract markets. See National Futures Association Manual ¶ 
7007 (1999), http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/manualFinancial.asp#fins7. 
 73. NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, OPPORTUNITY AND RISK: AN EDUCATION GUIDE 27 (2006), 
available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/investor/OppRisk/OppRisk.pdf. 
 74. Dana Atwood Lukens, Note, Regulation for the Securities Markets?, 10 ANN. REV. 
BANKING L. 379, 413 (1991). 
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requirements in securities markets are thought to help curb volatility,75 a 
condition the futures markets are not preoccupied with limiting.76 
The sheer magnitude of the discrepancy between the two margin levels 
might be difficult to reconcile, but it is not impossible. Securities-futures 
products, for example, are already subject to identical margin requirements 
regardless of whether they are traded on securities or futures exchanges.77 
Moreover, in the wake of the 1987 Crash, margin harmonization was 
suggested as an efficient way to prevent another meltdown.78 
The issue, therefore, is whether harmonized margins should be closer to 
the current futures or securities level. Recent scholarship that calls into 
question the classic assumption that higher margin requirements are an 
effective method of reducing stock market volatility may offer a partial 
answer.79 There is significant evidence that volatility in the markets leads to 
changes in margin requirements, in direct contrast to the conventional 
wisdom that the relationship operates in the other direction.80 As a result, 
one of the justifications for keeping securities margins so high is no longer 
as convincing as it once was.81 
On the other hand, lower rates do tend to result in greater credit 
allocation to securities and futures speculation.82 Although preventing this 
was the major concern of Congress when it originally enacted securities 
margin requirements, the overall percentage of the nation’s credit that is 
directed towards securities speculation is so low that it ceases to be a 
credible concern.83 Consequently, and in light of the fact that higher 
requirements tend to decrease the liquidity that futures markets need to 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. 
 76. Markham, supra note 4, at 363 (“Futures are not needed for commodities with stable 
prices. Such commodities do not need the benefits of hedging, and speculators are uninterested 
because there is no profit to be made from a stable price.”). But see 7 U.S.C.A. §6a(a) (“Sudden or 
unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of . . . [commodities are] an undue 
and unnecessary burden on interstate commerce.”). 
 77. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2(a)(1)(C)(v)(IV). 
It shall be unlawful for any futures commission merchant to, directly or indirectly, 
extend or maintain credit to or for, or collect margin from any customer on any security 
futures product unless such activities comply with the regulations prescribed pursuant 
to section 7(c)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Id. 
 78. BRADY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 52, at vii. 
 79. PAUL H. KUPIEC, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MARGIN 
REQUIREMENTS, VOLATILITY, AND MARKET INTEGRITY: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED SINCE THE 
CRASH? 8 (1997). 
 80. Id. at 29–31. 
 81. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 82. KUPIEC, supra note 79, at 32. 
 83. Robert J. Malloy, Margin Regulation: The Stock Market Crash of 1987, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 
693, 701 (1989) (noting that Federal Reserve studies indicate less than 3% of the nation’s credit is 
allocated towards securities speculation). 
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function properly,84 a harmonized margin requirement settled at a rate 
closer to the lower rates currently seen in futures markets seems more 
appropriate.85 
B. THE SUITABILITY REQUIREMENT 
Another key distinction between the two regulatory schemes is the so-
called “suitability requirement” of the securities industry, whereby broker-
dealers have a fiduciary duty not to recommend unsuitable investments to 
their customers when dispensing investment advice.86 While federal 
securities laws do not explicitly impose such a duty, securities SROs have 
promulgated rules to this effect pursuant to the SEC’s anti-fraud rule, 10b-
5.87 The federal courts and the SEC have likewise found and enforced a 
suitability requirement under Rule 10b-5.88 The basic premise of the rule is 
that when broker-dealers stand in a position of trust and confidence to their 
clients and make recommendations,89 if they know that any of those 
                                                                                                                 
 84. KUPIEC, supra note 79, at 5–6 (suggesting that the Federal Reserve Bank, the CFTC, and 
the Treasury department share concerns over the negative effect that increased margin 
requirements would have on futures market liquidity). 
 85. Id. at 5 (noting that the Brady Commission, in the wake of the 1987 Crash, suggested that 
harmonization would be helpful, but refused to recommend increasing futures margins to match 
securities margins—implying that a lowering of securities margins was perhaps more 
appropriate). 
 86. There is considerable scholarly debate surrounding the precise theory of liability upon 
which the “suitability requirement” rests. The full range of that discussion is far beyond the scope 
of this note, however, and it is sufficient for these purposes that the doctrine itself is universally 
accepted. 
 87. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to: (a) employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud; (b) make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business that operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon 
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. 
Id.; see NASD Rule 2310 (“broker-dealer must have reasonable basis for believing that a 
recommendation is suitable for a customer, given the information known or provided by the 
customer”). 
 88. Olde Discount Corp., 67 SEC Docket 2045, 1998 WL 575171, at *20–21 (1998); City of 
San Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. 84-20601, 1991 WL 352485, at *1–2 (N.D. 
Cal. 1991); Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that mere negligence is insufficient to 
sustain a cause of action under 10b-5, but that such an action requires an intent to deceive). 
 89. Courts are divided over whether or not a customer must have a discretionary account, 
where the broker-dealer is responsible for buying and selling on behalf of the client, in order to 
trigger the suitability requirement. Typically it will be enough to assert that a broker-dealer was 
held in trust and confidence by the client, and that his recommendations were followed as a result 
of that relationship. For a fuller discussion of this debate, see Baker v. Wheat First Sec., 643 
F.Supp. 1420, 1428–29 (S.D. W.Va. 1986). 
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recommendations is unsuitable they must inform their client.90 In order to 
facilitate that determination, SEC rules require the collection of information 
from each individual customer regarding income, net worth, investment 
objectives, and employment status.91 Violation of this requirement, like all 
10b-5 fraud violations, can result in a private action and civil liability.92 
Despite the similarity between the anti-fraud provisions of the 
Commodity Exchange Act and those of the Securities Exchange Act,93 
however, courts and the CFTC have held that “no rule of suitability governs 
the commodity broker-customer relationship under the Commodity 
Exchange Act or under the regulations adopted by the CFTC.”94 The CFTC 
did attempt to institute a formal suitability requirement in the late 1970s, 
but it was defeated, perhaps by industry pressures, in favor of a far more 
modest risk-disclosure requirement.95 Its official position was that it was 
“unable . . . to formulate meaningful standards of universal application.”96 
Although the NFA has adopted a “know your customer” rule,97 it is 
considered a business-conduct standard rather than an anti-fraud rule and 
creates no private right of action,98 in contrast to the 10b-5-based securities 
rules. The rule requires information-gathering from customers only so that 
the FCM will know what level of risk disclosure is appropriate for each 
customer, but it emphasizes that it is for the customer to decide whether any 
particular trade is suitable.99 This focus is intended to absolve FCMs of a 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Clark, 583 F.2d at 600; accord Rolf v. Blyth, Eastmon Dillan & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44–48 
(2d Cir. 1978) (holding that the suitability requirement is violated when a broker–dealer who has a 
duty to his client is reckless in his recommendations). 
 91. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3(a)(17)(i)(A) (2007). 
 92. Kardon v. Nat’ Gypsum Co., 69 F.Supp. 512, 513–14 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
 93. Trustman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. CV-82-6701, 1985 WL 28, 
at *14 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (“Because § 4(b)(A) is the commodities counterpart of § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5, the elements of a claim under § 4(b)(A) are basically the same as those under Rule 10b-
5.”). 
 94. Id. at 15; accord Phacelli v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., No. R80-385-80-704, 1986 WL 
68447, at *8–9 (C.F.T.C. Sept. 5, 1986). 
 95. Markham, supra note 4, at 355. 
 96. Adoption of Customer Protection Rules, 43 Fed. Reg. 31,886, at 31,888 (July 24, 1978). 
 97. Nat’l Futures Ass’n, Rule 2–30, Customer Information and Disclosure, available at 
http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/manualCompliance.asp#2–30 (last visited Oct. 23, 2007). 
 98. NFA Interpretive Notice, NFA Compliance Rule 2–30: Customer Information and Risk 
Disclosure (June 1, 1986), available at http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/ 
manualInterp.asp#InterpretiveNotices (last visited Oct. 23, 2007). 
NFA’s enactment of the Rule 2–30 should not be construed to expose Members to 
increased potential liability for damages in customer litigation or reparation 
proceedings, for several reasons. First, a business conduct standard promulgated by a 
self–regulatory organization does not create a private cause of action. Furthermore, 
Rule 2–30 is not an antifraud rule. 
Id. 
 99. Id.; see also Andrew M. Pardieck, Kegs, Crude and Commodities Law: On Why It Is Time 
to Re-examine the Suitability Doctrine, 7 NEV. L.J. 301, 346 (2007) (discussing the NFA’s historic 
opposition to any rules that would impose liability upon futures industry professionals). 
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duty to make suitable recommendations and prevent their exposure to 
liability in the case of customer litigation.100 
Harmonized regulation requires that this discrepancy between securities 
and futures rules be solved, and there is little reason to consider a 
satisfactory resolution out of reach. A possible solution that one prominent 
scholar has proposed would require advisors to use objective measures of 
wealth and income to make a blanket determination of whether futures 
trading is per se unsuitable for an individual investor.101 This rule is 
premised on the notion, currently espoused by both the CFTC and the NFA, 
that all futures contracts are risky and that meaningful distinctions cannot 
be made amongst them.102 However, although this might be an attractive 
rule from an administrative standpoint, it would cut against the 
individualized inquiry that is called for under the suitability requirements of 
the securities industry,103 maintaining a substantive difference between 
securities and futures trading and thereby defeating the purpose of 
harmonization.104 
Another approach, which the CFTC at one time recommended in a 
failed attempt to impose suitability requirements on the futures industry, 
would be to make an initial determination of per se suitability, and then a 
determination of the suitability of any particular trade.105 The second part of 
this test is similar to the securities industry’s highly individualized 
suitability requirement, which is helpful for the purposes of harmonization. 
But the first part is a blanket determination of the kind just rejected above, 
and would again defeat the purpose of harmonization by creating a formal 
wall between futures and securities for many customers. 
A more reasonable solution would be to simply impose the same 
suitability requirements on FCMs as are currently imposed on broker-
dealers. Having an identical rule is the best possible outcome for the 
purposes of harmonization.106 More importantly, adopting a formal 
                                                                                                                 
 100. NFA Interpretive Notice, NFA Compliance Rule 2–30: Customer Information and Risk 
Disclosure (June 1, 1986), http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/manualInterp.asp# 
InterpretiveNotices. 
 101. Pardieck, supra note 99, at 344. 
 102. Id. at 342–43. 
 103. See supra note 91. 
 104. A blanket determination that some customers simply cannot trade in particular instruments 
goes far beyond even the most stringent SEC suitability requirements. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, 
13 COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION, & OTHER CLAIMS § 10:1 (2008) 
(emphasizing the subjective, individual determination required by the SEC rule). 
 105. See Pardieck, supra note 99, at 343 (citing Standards of Conduct for Commodity Trading 
Professionals, 42 Fed. Reg. at 44,750). Note the evolution of the CFTC’s position: at one time 
advocating a two–tiered suitability determination, and at another arguing that suitability is 
inappropriate because all futures contracts are risky. 
 106. Note that FCMs are subject to a suitability requirement similar to that of the SEC when 
trading in security–futures products, so they are already familiar with its application. NFA Rule 2–
30(j)(4): Customer Information and Disclosure, http://www.nfa.futures.org/nfaManual/ 
manualCompliance.asp#2–30. 
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suitability rule will accomplish in form what many think is already 
occurring in substance: Administrative law judges and the CFTC have a 
habit of searching for “material misrepresentations of risk” when fact 
patterns suggest unsuitable recommendations by FCMs.107 Federal courts 
have also rendered decisions that appear to mask suitability claims under 
the cloak of material misrepresentations of risk.108 Moreover, the arguments 
against this kind of formal suitability rule in the futures industry are simply 
not very compelling. Although the NFA and CFTC are right to point out 
that risk is inherent in all futures contracts, commentators have been quick 
to retort that making meaningful distinctions based on factors such as the 
structure or size of a transaction is not terribly difficult.109 The CFTC itself 
argued as much when it first attempted to impose suitability rules.110 
Imposing the securities industry’s suitability rules uniformly across both 
industries therefore appears to be a reasonable and relatively simple route 
towards harmonization. 
C. INVESTMENT ACCOUNT PROTECTION 
Securities accounts are protected from the failure of the broker-dealers 
who administer them by the Securities Investment Protection Act of 1970 
(SIPA).111 That act was a response to the failure of a “significant number of 
brokerage firms” in the late 1960s, which saw the assets and investments of 
many consumers either lost or frozen as those firms went bankrupt.112 The 
Act created the Securities Investment Protection Corporation (SIPC), which 
is authorized to appoint a trustee for the purpose of liquidating a brokerage 
firm in the event that it is, or will soon be, unable to continue operating.113 
In such a proceeding, the SIPC places a high priority on returning to 
customers the property they have deposited at the firm,114 and guarantees 
customer assets up to $500,000, including up to $100,000 in cash,115 using 
funds collected by the SIPC from all member firms.116 
Futures accounts do not enjoy parallel protections. Although the 
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) prohibits FCMs from using one 
customer’s funds to maintain margin calls on another customer’s 
                                                                                                                 
 107. See Pardieck, supra note 99, at 326–30; accord MARKHAM, supra note 104, at § 10:7. 
 108. E.g., Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 34–36 (Mass. 1986); 
accord Crook v. Shearson Loeb Rhoades, Inc., 591 F.Supp. 40, 48–49 (D. Ind. 1983). 
 109. See Pardieck, supra note 99, at 343. 
 110. Id. at 343 (quoting the CFTC that “If the professional thought the risk of buying 10 
contracts was too great, the proper recommendation might be to purchase fewer contracts.”). 
 111. Pub. L. No. 598, 84 Stat. 1636 (1970). 
 112. Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 415 (1975). 
 113. See 15 U.S.C.A § 78eee (2006). 
 114. 15 U.S.C.A § 78fff-2(c)(1). 
 115. 15 U.S.C.A § 78fff-3(a). 
 116. See 15 U.S.C.A § 78ddd (regarding the establishment of the SIPC fund). 
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positions,117 and although customer funds must be segregated from the 
FCM’s own funds,118 they may be commingled with the funds of other 
customers119 and there is no central insurance system akin to the SIPC to 
protect customer assets in the event that an FCM goes under.120 Special 
bankruptcy rules require that segregated customer funds, to the extent they 
are available, must be paid back to the customer to whom they belong on a 
pro rata basis when an FCM goes bankrupt,121 but there is no guarantee that 
the available funds will be sufficient to meet those obligations. Those same 
rules also direct trustees in a bankruptcy proceeding to transfer customers’ 
open positions to solvent FCMs with whatever funds are available in the 
same pro rata fashion,122 but again there is no guarantee that sufficient funds 
will be available to achieve this. The net result of this arrangement is that 
“the entire segregated account is at risk when one customer places trades 
that he cannot cover and that are too large for the broker to cover either.”123 
At no point is any sum of money that has been deposited with an FCM 
insured or protected in a manner comparable to the regime provided by the 
SIPA. 
The CFTC considered such a program in the wake of several high-
profile FCM insolvencies during the 1980’s, but ultimately concluded that it 
was not cost-effective.124 The NFA concurred in that determination, but 
noted that were it to be created, the compensation regime under such a 
program would have to focus on facilitating the transfer, rather than 
liquidation, of open positions in order to avoid involuntarily exposing 
customers to unfavorable market prices.125 This is the same priority 
expressed in the FCM bankruptcy provisions,126 and both are rooted in the 
concern that FCM bankruptcies should not be allowed to disrupt the market, 
harm investor confidence, or interfere with bona fide hedging activities.127 
Precisely because of these priorities, SIPA protections should be 
extended to cover the cost of transferring open positions in futures 
accounts, up to a pre-determined amount. The current ad-hoc process of 
determining how much, or how little, money is available on a pro rata basis 
                                                                                                                 
 117. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6d(a)(2) (2007). 
 118. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6d(a)(2). 
 119. Id. 
 120. In re Griffin Trading Co., 245 B.R. 291, 302 (Bankr. N D. Ill. 2000). 
 121. 17 C.F.R. § 190.08(c) (2007). 
 122. 17 C.F.R. § 190.06(e)(2). But note that customers do have a right to contact the trustee 
and, upon payment of any additional funds required to meet margin, transfer the full balance of 
their open positions to a solvent FCM. 17 C.F.R. § 190.02(g)(3). 
 123. Griffin, 245 B.R. at 301. 
 124. Andrea M. Corcoran & Susan C. Ervin, Maintenance of Market Strategies in Futures 
Broker Insolvencies: Futures Position Transfers From Troubled Firms, 44 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 
849, 869–70 (1987). 
 125. Id. at 870. 
 126. See supra note 122. 
 127. Corcoran & Ervin, supra note 124, at 884–85. 
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from the insolvent FCM to fund the transfer of customers’ open positions is 
simply too complicated and too uncertain to provide adequate protection for 
either customers or the marketplace.128 Without guarantees of sufficient 
funding, such as those provided by a SIPA-like program, other FCMs may 
not be willing to receive open positions from customers of the bankrupt 
FCM,129 resulting in considerable losses to everyone involved.130 A 
harmonized program would compensate customers for losses in securities in 
the manner currently provided for by the SIPA,131 and continue to provide 
reliable short-term funding for the transfer of open positions in futures on 
an ad-hoc basis, as the FCM bankruptcy rules currently do.132 
D. INSIDER TRADING 
The Securities Exchange Act makes it unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and 
regulations as the Commission may prescribe.”133 This broad provision is 
the basis for Rule 10b-5, which prohibits “engag[ing] in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.”134 These provisions ban the practice of insider trading, which 
courts have defined as either “trad[ing] in the securities of [a] corporation 
on the basis of material, nonpublic information,”135 or “misappropriat[ing] 
confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty 
owed to the source of the information.”136 The former definition, known as 
the classical theory, is aimed at “corporate insiders” such as directors, 
officers, lawyers, or bankers, and is based on the notion that they have a 
fiduciary duty to shareholders of the corporation not to trade for their own 
                                                                                                                 
 128. See id. at 902–03. 
 129. Id. at 906–07. 
 130. Just such a situation occurred when an FCM became insolvent during the 1980’s. See id. at 
913. 
That case reflected that even full compliance with the Commodity Exchange Act’s 
stringent segregation requirements could not assure the firm’s customers against loss 
and that once such losses had occurred, no formal governmental or self-regulatory 
program was in place to restore such losses. Moreover, the positions of the firm’s 
customers were liquidated without any serious attempt to transfer them, reflecting the 
current absence of any mechanism to replenish available segregated funds to provide 
margin sufficient to permit transfers. 
Id. 
 131. See supra notes 115–16. 
 132. See supra note 122. 
 133. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 134. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). 
 135. U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997). 
 136. Id. at 652. 
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personal benefit on the basis of inside information.137 The latter definition, 
known as the misappropriation theory, is aimed at “corporate outsiders” 
who happen to come across inside information, and it is based on the notion 
that their fiduciary duty is to the source of that information, whom they 
defraud if they trade on that information without disclosing their 
intentions.138 Whether by insider or outsider, the clear intent is to prohibit 
traders from profiting off the use of non-public information, as this is an 
effective way of “insur[ing] the maintenance of fair and honest markets.”139 
The Commodity Exchange Act, by comparison, generally does not 
prohibit insider trading. This is largely because one of the basic functions of 
the futures markets is to allow hedgers, based on knowledge of their own 
positions, to shift the risk of their commodity positions.140 The other basic 
function of the futures markets is price discovery, whereby all market 
information known to both hedgers and speculators is reflected by the 
market price of any given contract.141 Consequently, CEA provisions 
against the use of material non-public information target only CFTC 
regulatory personnel142 and contract market or futures industry compliance 
personnel.143 These persons are prohibited from trading with material non-
public information,144 and from giving it to others for the purpose of 
trading.145 Recipients who know the source of such information are likewise 
prohibited from trading with it.146 The concern of the Commodity Exchange 
Act, generally speaking, is not so much that traders will profit through the 
use of non-public information,147 but that someone involved in market 
regulation will use their position to gain unfair access to information about 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). 
 138. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654–55 (suggesting that this theory of liability has a rather 
significant loophole, however, because “if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to 
trade on the nonpublic information, there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation—
although the fiduciary-turned-trader may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of 
loyalty.”). 
 139. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b (2006). 
 140. Jerry W. Markham, ‘Front-Running’—Insider Trading Under the Commodity Exchange 
Act, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 69, 105 n.221 (1988). 
 141. See Chester S. Spatt, Chief Economist and Dir., Office of Econ. Analysis, SEC, Keynote 
Address at Wilton Park Conference on Capital Flows and the Safety of Markets: Volatility, Price 
Discovery, and Markets (Nov. 10, 2006) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch111006css.htm) (describing generally the price 
discovery process). 
 142. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(c), (d) (2007). 
 143. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(f)(1)–(2). 
 144. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(f)(1). 
 145. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(d)(1), (f)(1). 
 146. 7 U.S.C.A. § 13(d)(2), (f)(2). 
 147. But see 7 U.S.C.A. § 6j (prohibiting the practice of “dual–trading,” which is a kind of 
insider trading performed by FCMs who, upon receipt of a customer order, place their own trade 
before that of the customer in such a way as to profit from what is to come). 
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“changes in the futures trading environment that might occur through the 
exercise of an exchange’s emergency authority.”148 
This disparity in insider-trading regulation represents a significant 
challenge for the harmonization of securities and futures markets. On the 
one hand, research suggests that the strict insider trading regime of the 
securities industry has had numerous positive effects on securities markets, 
including more informative pricing and greater liquidity.149 On the other 
hand, the infusion of heretofore non-public information into the futures 
markets, in conjunction with bona fide hedging activities, is considered one 
of their fundamental features.150 More concretely, applying the securities 
industry prohibition uniformly onto the futures industry would simply be 
impracticable, as the rubric of fraud and the duties it implicates in order to 
analyze insider trading does not exist in the futures industry.151 It would 
likewise be impossible to apply the futures industry’s laissez faire “insider 
trading” regime to the securities industry, as it would eviscerate all 
protection against the concern that corporate insiders will use non-public 
information to trade in the securities of their own corporations to the 
disadvantage of outsiders.152 
At the outset, a harmonized insider trading rule should not be premised 
on the breach of a fiduciary duty, as the concept has no application to the 
futures markets153 and is already quite strained when applied to some 
securities transactions.154 One potential alternative might be to draw from 
the proposal of Professor Jerry Markham, originally aimed only at the 
futures industry in response to the stock market crash of 1987, to 
distinguish between the use of inside information for bona fide hedging and 
the use of inside information for the purpose of gaining an unfair advantage 
                                                                                                                 
 148. Markham, supra note 140, at 110. 
 149. Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary Comparative 
Evidence, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144, 174 (2005). 
 150. See Markham, supra note 140, at 93–94. 
 151. Nina Swift Goodman, Trading in Commodity Futures Using Non–Public Information, 73 
GEO. L. J. 127, 144–51(1984). 
 152. Recall that the futures industry only prevents market regulators from trading with certain 
material non–public information. Supra notes 142–44. 
 153. Goodman, supra note 151, at 144–46 (explaining that there are no “insiders” on a futures 
contract like there are for a corporation’s stock, and there can be no misappropriation from the 
source of information because it does not defraud him to trade with the knowledge he imparts). 
 154. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin 
of the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 475–76 (2001) Krawiec illustrates 
the absurdity of depending on breaches of fiduciary duty by noting that 
defenders of the current system of insider trading regulation have failed to explain why 
trading on information overheard in conversations, gleaned from documents in a 
briefcase stolen from a stranger, entrusted to a hairdresser by one of her clients or to a 
husband by his wife are [not prohibited], while trading on information gained in a tip 
from an insider, from information stolen from one’s employer or father, or entrusted to 
a physician by his patient are [prohibited]. 
Id. 
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in anticipation of others’ market-moving actions.155 This approach focuses 
on preventing unfair advantage, as insider trading prohibitions are meant to 
do in the first place.156 This approach would also comport well with the 
principles-based regulation that has been so effective for the CFTC,157 as it 
would provide the flexibility necessary to distinguish between acceptable 
disparities of market information and genuinely unfair practices,158 while 
still allowing for bona fide hedging transactions. 
E. BROKER-DEALER AND FCM REGISTRATION AND OPERATION 
Broker-Dealers make public access to securities markets possible, as 
their purpose is to “effect securities transactions, provide investment advice, 
take custody of securities and funds, extend credit, and even exercise 
investment discretion.”159 Although commonly lumped together by both lay 
persons and professionals, “broker” and “dealer” are technically two 
different classifications. A “broker” is “any person engaged in the business 
of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others,”160 while a 
“dealer” is “any person engaged in the business of buying and selling 
securities for such person’s own account through a broker or otherwise.”161 
Both definitions exclude banks,162 and “dealer” does not encompass a 
person who “buys or sells for [their] own account . . . but not as part of a 
regular business.”163 Both definitions do, however, include persons who 
conduct business solely on the floor of a securities exchange.164 Despite this 
technical difference, most firms are both brokers and dealers and there is 
virtually no difference in the substantive regulation of the two, particularly 
as the determination of who constitutes a broker or dealer is a fact-based 
inquiry that involves many factors common to both.165 As a result, they are 
commonly referred to jointly as “broker-dealers.” 
All broker-dealers, with the exception of those doing purely intrastate 
business, are required to register with the SEC.166 Employees of broker-
                                                                                                                 
 155. Markham, supra note 140, at 123–24. 
 156. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b (2006). 
 157. Bart Chilton, Comm’r, CFTC, Remarks Before the Futures Industry Association, Law and 
Compliance Luncheon (Nov. 13, 2007). 
 158. U.S. v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658–59 (1997) (distinguishing between material non–
public information that is gained through skill and research and that which is gained through 
misappropriation from an otherwise inside source). 
 159. David A. Lipton, A Primer on Broker–Dealer Registration, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 899, 899 
(1987). 
 160. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(4) (2006). 
 161. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(5). 
 162. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(4)(B), (5)(C). 
 163. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(5)(B). 
 164. Lipton, supra note 159, at 905. 
 165. See generally id. at 908–43 (providing a detailed examination of the various factors that go 
into this determination). 
 166. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(a)(1). 
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dealers are considered “registered representatives”167 and do not have to 
register with the SEC,168 but they are required to register with the NASD.169 
Upon registration, broker-dealers must adhere to a minimum net capital 
requirement based on one of two standards:170 Either they may not allow 
their aggregate indebtedness to exceed 800% of their net capital, or they 
may not allow their net capital to be less than $250,000 or 2% of their 
calculated Reserve Requirement, whichever is greater.171 
The futures industry’s functional equivalent of the broker-dealer is the 
FCM, which is defined as an 
individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust that is engaged in 
soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase of any commodity for 
future delivery . . . and in connection with such solicitation or acceptance 
of orders, accepts any money, securities or property . . . to margin, 
guarantee or secure and trades or contracts.172 
In addition, the futures industry recognizes “introducing brokers” (IBs), 
which are treated like FCMs in almost every respect except that they cannot 
accept any “money, securities, or property . . . to margin, guarantee, or 
secure any trades or contracts.”173 Every FCM and IB must be registered 
with the CFTC.174 In contrast to the employees of broker-dealers, however, 
the employees of FCMs or IBs must also register with the CFTC as 
“associated persons.”175 Moreover, those who confine their activities to the 
trading floor and trade for their own accounts, or for the accounts of others, 
are subject to a separate registration regime as either “floor traders” or 
“floor brokers.”176 Each FCM must meet certain minimum financial 
requirements177 by maintaining net capital in excess of the greater of either 
$250,000,178 or 8% of the total risk margin of their customer accounts plus 
4% of the total risk margin of their non-customer accounts.179 IBs are 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Lipton, supra note 159, at 909. 
 168. But see 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(1) (requiring that any person “associated with [a] broker or 
dealer” be named on the broker–dealer’s registration. Such associated persons are defined in 15 
U.S.C.A. § 78c(a)(18) to include partners, managers, officers, and all employees who are not of a 
ministerial or clerical capacity). 
 169. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b7-1 (2007); accord NASD Rule 1030, available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/finra/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=1189&element_id=115900044
5 (last visited Oct. 26, 2007). 
 170. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b2-2. 
 171. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1(a)(1) (note that aggregate indebtedness may not exceed 1500% of 
net capital during the first 12 months of operation). 
 172. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a(20) (2007). 
 173. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a(23). 
 174. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6d. 
 175. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6k(1). 
 176. 7 U.S.C.A. § 1a(16)–(17). Note, however, that both are subject to registration. 7 U.S.C.A. 
§ 6e. 
 177. 7 U.S.C.A. § 6f(b). 
 178. 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(1)(i)(A) (2007). 
 179. 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(1)(i)(B). 
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subject to less stringent financial requirements, as they must only maintain 
a minimum net capital of at least $30,000,180 or may choose to enter into an 
agreement with an FCM to guarantee its financial obligations.181 
In addition to the initial requirements of registration, both broker-
dealers and FCMs182 are continually subject to a wide variety of reporting 
and recordkeeping requirements.183 The sheer number of different records 
and reports they must perform makes a rigorous examination of all of them 
impractical for the purposes of this note, but for both industries they 
generally include detailed records of the firm’s finances, precise records of 
customer account balances and activities and regular disclosure to both 
customer and regulators.184 In addition, broker-dealers and FCMs must keep 
detailed records and make reports to regulators with regard to their risk-
assessment regimes.185 While there are minor differences in the form and 
timing of these requirements, they are for the most part very similar. The 
most significant difference is the settlement cycle by which customer 
accounts reflect changes in positions. FCMs must mark to market their 
customers’ accounts on a daily basis,186 whereas broker dealers have three 
days to do so.187 
Very little imagination is required to harmonize these regulations. 
Indeed, they are already quite similar. Combining brokers, dealers and 
FCMs into a single entity able to conduct business in both securities and 
futures might result in an entity defined as: 
Any individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust that is 
engaged in soliciting or in (1) accepting orders for the purchase of any 
commodity for future delivery; (2) effecting transactions in securities for 
the account of others; or (3) the business of buying and selling securities 
for such person’s own account as part of a regular business; and in 
connection with such activities, accepts any money, securities or property 
to margin, guarantee or secure and trades or contracts.188 
                                                                                                                 
 180. 17 C.F.R. § 1.17(a)(1)(iii)(A). 
 181. 17 C.F.R. § 1.10(j). 
 182. Hereinafter, any reference to FCMs also encompasses IBs. 
 183. See generally 15 U.S.C.A. § 78q(a)(1) (2006); 7 U.S.C.A. § 6g (2007) (authorizing 
recordkeeping and reporting for both industries, respectively). 
 184. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-2-5; §§ 1.10, .18, .31–.37 (regarding securities and 
futures, respectively). 
 185. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17h-1T, -2T; § 1.14-5. 
 186. 17 C.F.R. § 1.32. This process results in FCMs paying any excess or collecting any 
shortfall in their customers’ margin requirements on a daily basis. NAT’L FUTURES ASS’N, supra 
note 73, at 27–28. 
 187. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c6-1. 
 188. This is a simple combination of the statutory definitions currently in place for brokers, 
dealers, and FCMs. See supra notes 160, 161 and 172 and accompanying text. 
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Whether to maintain an alternative classification for IBs,189 and how to 
classify professionals whose activities are confined solely to the trading 
floor,190 are policy questions that scholars have not yet debated. 
Other areas of these regulations could be harmonized in an equally 
straightforward manner. Harmonizing the minimum financial requirements 
for the combined broker-dealer-FCM entity would require a more rigorous 
econometric analysis of their intended purpose than is feasible here, but 
given the similarity between current regulations, a minimum of $250,000 
appears to be a reasonable starting point for such a discussion.191 Likewise, 
the similarity between reporting and record-keeping requirements192 should 
make harmonization relatively simple. One point where harmonization will 
require genuine change is in settlement periods, which might best be set at a 
daily mark to market in order to preserve the integrity it currently provides 
for futures contracts,193 and extend that protection to securities.194 
V. CONCLUSION 
Achieving a harmonized regulatory environment for securities and 
futures will not be an easy task,195 but it should be on the agenda of any 
policymaker who wishes for the United States’ financial markets to remain 
competitive.196 Indeed, as this note goes to press the Treasury Secretary has 
just released the Department’s Blueprint for a Modernized Financial 
                                                                                                                 
 189. There is no analogue to the IB in the securities industry. 
 190. See supra notes 164 and 176 (Recall that SEC rules require these professionals to be 
registered as broker-dealers, while CFTC rules provide them with a separate regulatory 
framework). 
 191. See supra notes 171 and 178 (wherein both broker-dealers and FCMS are currently able to 
satisfy minimum financial requirements with $250,000). 
 192. See supra note 184. 
 193. Daily mark-to-market settlement, a feature of futures markets, increases liquidity by 
allowing traders to realize their gains on a daily basis, and improves market stability by forcing 
traders to realize their losses on a daily basis as well. This is in contrast to the three-day settlement 
period of securities markets, which forces traders to wait several days before realizing gains, and 
may allow losses to accumulate for several days before they must be accounted for. See Securities 
Transaction Settlement, Release No. 8398, 2004 WL 482332, at *11 (Mar. 11, 2004). 
 194. The SEC recently noted that a shorter settlement cycle in the securities markets would 
improve their efficiency and reduce their risks. Id. at *12. 
Shortening the settlement cycle to T+1, for example, also would synchronize the 
settlement of corporate and derivative securities and have liquidity benefits. By 
reducing the lag between the settlement of derivatives and government securities and 
the settlement of equity and corporate securities, investors that participate in both 
markets would be able to reduce their financing costs and obtain the proceeds of their 
securities transactions on a timelier basis. 
Id. 
 195. See supra Part II (detailing the failure of the Markets and Trading Reform Act. Note, 
however, that it was a relatively un-ambitious regulatory reshuffling, as opposed to wholesale 
reform). 
 196. See DeWaal, supra note 37; MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 41. 
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Regulatory Structure,197 which in part calls for precisely the kinds of 
harmonization detailed here.198 Although the Blueprint has been criticized 
in the popular press as nothing more than a “rearrangement of the boxes on 
the org chart,”199 in the area of harmonizing securities and futures 
regulations it prescribes more than mere bureaucratic reshuffling,200 and has 
called for a joint CFTC-SEC task force to examine the matter substantively 
and in depth.201 This note’s recommendations should provide a useful 
starting point for some of that group’s work. 
The Treasury Blueprint is a far more comprehensive and far-ranging 
examination of financial regulatory harmonization,202 but the discrete areas 
of securities and futures regulation that have been examined in this note are 
important pieces of the puzzle. Harmonizing margin requirements at a level 
close to that of current futures margins can sufficiently protect markets 
from excessive risk and provide much-needed liquidity.203 Identical 
suitability rules are a sensible way to protect investors from unscrupulous or 
irresponsible advice, regardless of the particular products being 
recommended.204 The extension of SIPA-like protections to all accounts 
would enhance investor confidence and stabilize the marketplace when a 
broker-dealer or FCM goes under.205 A well-crafted insider trading 
prohibition that targets only the unfair use of inside information will 
provide security and promote fairness across markets, while still allowing 
legitimate hedging to proceed.206 And harmonized broker-dealer/FCM 
registration requirements will allow market professionals to more 
efficiently offer a wide variety of diverse and innovative financial 
products.207 All of these are necessary regulatory adjustments that must be 
made in order for U.S. markets to remain competitive and stable as 
securities and futures continue to converge in the twenty-first century. 
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